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INTRODUCTION

A nine-year-old boy is targeted for sexual torture and murder by
child pornographers conspiring to produce a sex-snuff film.' A cross
is burnt on the lawn of an elderly, ill black couple living in a rural and
isolated all-white area.2 A six-week-old infant is beaten to death by his
father.3 The criminal conduct described above might in its particulars
be found especially repulsive and inflammatory. Although these acts
would be deplorable under any circumstances, the context in which
they occurred exacerbates the moral blameworthiness of the conduct.
Specifically, the victims described in these scenarios share a common
trait: extreme vulnerability.
1

United States v. Depew, 932 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 210

(1991).
2 United States v. Salyer, 893 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1989).
3
United States v. Boise, 916 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 2057
(1991).
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Intuitively, we recognize that criminal conduct directed at the
particularly vulnerable displays an extra measure of depravity on the
part of the actor.4 Historically, this recognition led to intensified punishment for criminals who target such victims. The intensification
may be overt, as in laws proscribing criminal conduct defined by particular victims; for example, child pornography statutes, which codify
particularly strong sanctions. Alternatively, in keeping with the wide
range of judicial discretion in sentencing,5 recognition of victim vulnerability may be less overt and more idiosyncratic. 6 Individuals who
engage in identical criminal conduct may receive dissimilar sentences,
according to their choice of victim. 7 These sentences may further vary
4

See RicHARD G. SINGER, JusT DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT

86-87 (1979) ("[C]riminals who knowingly select victims who are incapable of defending
themselves are more morally blameworthy than others."). Id. at 86. One researcher has
noted, while analyzing the typical robber's modus operandi: "favored targets for random
street robberies are drunks, women with purses, individuals standing by disabled vehicles,
and strangers who look as if they do not belong in the area or who obviously are lost."
Edward Tromanhauser, The Offender and the Victim, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 145, 151 (1989).
Tromanhauser also graphs generic defendant assessment of victim vulnerability on a chart
ranging from easy targets to hard targets. Id.
5 "Under the system of criminal sentencing that prevailed for a century prior to the
SEA, judges received wide ranges within which to sentence, but no anchoring point from
which to begin ....

Personal preference dictated each judge's methodology.. : ." Daniel

J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1687-88 (1992). See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN
70-76 (1988) for a discussion by

JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS

judges of their perceived difficulties in calculating sentences for white-collar criminal activity where "you are dealing with ... so-called victimless crimes, and one doesn't find in that
kind of crime some of the factors which incline [ajudge] at least to think almost automatically of a term in prison." Id. at 71. Thejudges conclude that "[w]ith respect to individual
victims, there [is] a special concern for those that are viewed as being more defenseless...
or being in a weaker position to defend themselves." Id. at 72.
6

See PIERCE O'DoNNELL ET AL, TOWARD A JusT AND EFECrE SENTENCING SYSTEM:

AGENDA FOR

LEGISLATIVE REFORM 3 (1977), describing pre-guideline sentencers as "left free

to formulate and apply their own personal theories of punishment. They are allowed to
impose their beliefs, or biases, or prejudices, or reactions to particular defendants within
the very wide margins afforded by our present statutory range of sentences." Id. See also
Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
391 (1989) (identifying inroads by the victim's rights movement as shifting the balance too
far in favor of victim impact evidence and calling for a more principled judicial limitation
on the consideration of such evidence by employing a relevancy test incorporating the
concept of culpability and disallowing evidence overly prejudicial to defendants).
7 See 1 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RFSEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR
REFORM 83-88 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983) (discussing the role of the victim as a
primary determinant of sentences and researchers' uncertainty of the role played by sentence determinants generally in influencing sentencing outcomes). Cf. Phillip A. Talbert,
The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the CriminalSentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REv.
199, 215-16 & n.67 (1988) (discussing the impropriety of allowing victim participation at
sentencing generally, and at determinate sentencing in particular, to increase the severity
of criminal sanctions because it causes different defendants convicted of similar crimes to
receive disparate sentences in violation of the principle of equality in sentencing). But see
Willard E. Sperry, Victim Impact Evidence Within a RetributiveSystem ofJustice; 25 CREIGHTON L.
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depending on particular judges' subjective views of the blameworthiness inherent in the selection of certain victims."
The United States Sentencing Guidelines9 were promulgated to
severely limit such judicial discretion in sentencing. 10 Since their
mandate in 1984, through their issuance in 1987, to their most recent
amendment in 1992, they have provoked a great deal of controversy
and commentary. Much of the scholarship involves global criticism of
federal determinate sentencing. Commentators have compared perceived pre-guideline sentencing inequities with post-guideline sentencing, 1 discussed the values which inform the guidelines' rejection
of judicial discretion in sentencing, 12 and assessed the success 1 3 (or
REv. 1275 (1992) (arguing that the admission of victim impact evidence in capital sentencing is ethical within a retributive system).
8 See generally Lois G. FoRER, CRMINALs AND VIcrIMS: A TRIAL JUDGE REFLECTs ON
CRIME AND PuNIsHmENT (1980). Forer notes that "[u]ntil recently, there were few regula-

tions or limitations on the sentence which might be imposed and few restrictions or rules
regulating the procedures to be followed in imposing sentence." Id. at 2. MARVIN E. FRANEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WrrHoUr ORDER 17 (1972) [hereinafter FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES] ("[T]he trial judge is not discouraged from venting any tendencies toward
righteous arrogance."); Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1
(1972). Cf. Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the FederalSentencing GuidelinesMeeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY LJ. 393, 395-96
(1991) (after noting that the "identity of the judge became a better predictor of incarceration than the defendant and the crime" in discussing pre-guideline sentencing principles,
the authors observe that judges "therefore enjoyed wide discretion to sentence in accordance with their own theories regarding criminal sanctions and with any personal biases and
prejudices.").
9
UNrrED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1992) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.].
10 This Note explicitly offers no judgment on the wisdom of this decision to limit
judicial discretion. Its' thesis merely assumes that by predicating the achievement of the
underlying goals of sentencing on a system that severely limits judicial discretion, covert
recovery of such discretion will defeat the overall goals of the guidelines. See supra note 8
and infranotes 11-15 for a discussion the wisdom and ramifications of the overall approach
employed by the sentencing guidelines. One commentator provides the following
thought-provoking conclusion, offered here as a backdrop for exploring § 3Al.1's goal of
shaping and limiting a sentencer's inquiry and decision-making options:
A sense ofjustice is essential to one's participation in a system for allocating
criminal penalties. When the penalty structure offends those charged with
the daily administration of the criminal law, tension arises between the
judge's duty to follow the written law and the judge's oath to administer
justice.
Freed, supra note 5, at 1687.
11 See Katie & Sager, supra note 8; Note, An Argumentfor ConfrontationUnder the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1880 (1992).
12
See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Res 17 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1, (1988); Andrew von Hirsch, FederalSentencing Guidelines: Do They ProidePrincipled Guidance2, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 367 (1989).
13
See Karle & Sager, supra note 8, at 420 (noting that their "study indicates that, with
the exception of their impact upon prisons, the Guidelines seem to be accomplishing their
general goals," while qualifying their assessment with concerns about unwarranted departures); Kathryn A. Walton, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Miracle Curefor Disparity (Caution: Apply Only as Directed), 79 Ky. LJ. 385, 389 (1991) ("[T]he Guidelines are far from
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failure) ' 4 of the sentencing guidelines in achieving true and just reformation of federal sentencing.
A far smaller body of work has addressed the practical problems

and pitfalls that have arisen in the application of this complex statutory sentencing scheme. 15 Now, five years after the promulgation of
the guidelines, the existing body of appellate case law provides a basis
for assessing the application of the more idiosyncratic aspects of the
guidelines. An analysis of these cases reveals divergent and contradictory approaches taken by the federal circuits. This variance precludes

uniformity in sentencing, the desire for which was the wellspring of
the federal guidelines.
This Note explores section 3A1.1' 6 of the federal sentencing
guidelines, the "vulnerable victim" enhancement of federal sentences.
Section 3A1.1 codifies judicial discretion to impose harsher sentences
on defendants who commit similar crimes, but whose choice of victim
identifies them as deserving greater punishment.
Codification of sentence enhancement according to victim vulnerability has proven to be a particularly difficult undertaking.' 7 Codpolished, but with careful application and a conscious regard of congressional objectives by
the sentencing courts, the guidelines are the beginning of a fair and efficient federal sentencing system."). Cf Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Sentencing Commission, P.M.
(Post-Mistretta): Sunshine or Sunset?, 27 AM. CGuM. L. RF.v. 289 (1989) ("If the Commission
persists in narrowing its own horizon, then the likely outcome is an early sunset to the
Commission's useful existence, if not its formal existence as well.").
14
The commentary pronouncing failure far outweighs that deeming the guidelines
successful. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor
Less Aggregation, 58 U. Cmr. L. REv. 901, 949 (1991) ("[Tlhe equality produced by current
guidelines systems is illusory."); Freed, supra note 5, at 1752 ("These rigid statutes are
wholly at odds with the sort of principled guidance and permissible individualization of
penalties that Congress prescribed in the SRA."); Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States
Sentencing Commission Miss?, 101 YALE LJ. 1773 (1992); Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A CallforCooperation, 101 YALE L.J. 1755 (1992) ("IT]he imposition of rigid guidelines
by an administrative agency on a sentencing system is destined to failure"); Note, supra
note 11, at 1889 ("[T]he Commission left.., a... serious affront to criminal defendants'
rights: constitutionally inadequate factfinding procedures that admit patently unreliable
evidence for sentencing.").
15 See generally Susan E. Ellingstad, Note, The Sentencing Guidelines: DownwardDepartures
Based on a Defendant's ExtraordinaryFamily Ties and Responsibilities, 76 Mm-N. L. REv. 957
(1992); Tony Garoppolo, Confusion andDistortionin theFederalSentencingProcess,27 CiuM. L.
BuLL. 3 (1991) (discussing application problems resulting from discrepancies between
guideline sections and their accompanying commentary);Jonathan D. Lupkin, 5K1.1 and
Substantial Assistance Departure: The Illusory Carrot of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 1519 (1991); Walton, supra note 13 (discussing departures based on criminal history and substantial assistance to authorities); David I. Shapiro, Sentencing the Reformed Addict: Departure Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Problem of Drug
Rehabilitation,91 COLUM. L. REv. 2051 (1991).
16
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, Vulnerable Victim.
17
"[A]ll criminals select victims whom they believe... will be unable to defend themselves. If a provision is to especially single out this mental element of an offense, it should
be as precise as possible." SINGER, supra note 4, at 86. Singer lists four "vulnerable victim"
codifications, all of which he views as unsuccessful. Id. at 86-87.
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ifying vulnerability as a factor and seeking to enhance sentences
across the whole range of criminal conduct requires a broad approach
to application. Consequently, unless restricted to clearly defined criteria and parameters, section 3A1.1 risks becoming a vehicle for covert, individualized judicial discretion.' 8 Injection of such discretion
can only undermine the guidelines' goal of uniformity across sentencing and proportionality within individual sentences.19 This Note identifies and argues for section 3A1.1 application principles that will
promote measured and consistent sentence enhancement. Unprincipled and inconsistent enhancement will give rise to the unjust sentencing disparities that the guidelines sought to eliminate, thereby
ensuring the guidelines' failure.
Part L.A of this Note describes the promulgation of the federal
sentencing guidelines and identifies the guidelines' underlying values.
Part I.B illustrates sentence computation under the guidelines, noting
in particular the role of the vulnerable victim adjustment in the process. Finally, Part I.C explores the purpose and focus of section 3Al.1
by analysing the enhancement's statutory language and accompanying
official commentary. Illustrative cases that display a measured and
principled application of section 3A1.1 are also examined.
Part II identifies particular problem areas that have arisen during
judicial application of the enhancement. These problems are examined through the analysis of inconsistent and contradictory approaches taken by the federal circuit courts towards vulnerable victim
enhancement. The problems fall into three categories: (i) judicial
failure to identify and articulate reasoning that suppports a finding of
particularvulnerability not present in all victims of the criminal conduct being sentenced; (ii) improper imposition of a requirement that
See Freed, supra note 5, at 1683:
[T]he guidelines system initiated in 1987 simultaneously proceeds on two
different levels: (1) the level of formal, visible adherence to, or open departure from, guideline prescriptions in the trial courts, followed by review
in the courts of appeals; and (2) the level of informal noncompliance with
the new system-practices that are eluding scrutiny by courts of appeals
.... Increasingly, the second, underground level of sentencing seems to be
displacing the first, visible level.
19 Section 3AI.1 is broadly applicable to all criminal conduct, and, as such, engenders
the implicit tension between uniformity and porportionality. One commentator has written that:
At first glance, uniformity and proportionality appear to be logically interwoven. In reality, however, tension exists between the two objectives making it difficult simultaneously to achieve both goals. In order to perfect
uniformity, the criminal justice system would have to be based on broad
offense categories.... On the other hand, to perfect proportionality, categories would be eliminated and each offender's sentence would be tailormade ....
[T]he Commission compromised, resulting in integration of
both goals but perfection of neither goal.
Walton, supra note 13, at 391.
18
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the identified victim vulnerability must have motivated the defendant
to target that victim; and (iii) judicial categorization of victims who
share a particular characteristic as per se vulnerable to certain criminal
conduct. Proper section 3A1.1 application is illustrated through an
examination of the better reasoned cases found within each category.
Part II further identifies the manner in which these application disparities undermine the goals of the sentencing guidelines.
Finally, Part III of this Note identifies a paradigmatic approach to
the application of section 3A1.1 based on principles drawn from the
cases illustrating measured, proper and consistent application of the
enhancement to the identified problem areas. This Note ultimately
suggests that adherence to such an approach will enable sentencing
courts to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement in a consistent and
just manner.
I
PRINCIPLES AND PRoCEss: Tm FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND VULNERABLE VICTIM
ENHANCEMENT

A.

The Underlying Goals of the Federal Guidelines and the
Process of Guideline Promulgation
Overt disenchantment with the American judiciary's traditionally

broad discretion in sentencing developed in the early 1970's. 20 The

sentencing issues that gave birth to the federal sentencing guidelines,
however, are not exclusively modem considerations. As far back as
the colonial period, American jurisprudence struggled to strike a balance between strict codification and judicial discretion in
21
sentencing.
When Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,22
[hereinafter SRA], it established the United States Sentencing Commission. The Commission was to promulgate judicial federal sentencing guidelines, establishing the "policies and practices" that would
"provide certainty and fairness in . . . sentencing, avoiding unwar-

ranted sentencing disparities" between like offenderg guilty of like
criminal conduct, while maintaining sufficient flexibility to allow for
20

See ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 3-

5 (1987) (ascribing the shift during this period to growing disfavor with both the rehabilitative model of punishment, and the consequent disfavor with discretion in sentencing,
which had previously been thought to enable the systemic functioning of rehabilitation).
21 SeeJoel Samaha, Fixed Sentences andJudicialDiscretion in HistoricalPerspective, 15 WM.
MrrcHELL L. REv. 217 (1989).
22 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 35513559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988) [hereinafterSRA]). The SRA is chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3551-86, 3621-25, 3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988)).
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consideration of individual mitigating and aggravating factors not
taken into account by established general sentencing practices. 23 The
guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987,24 and have subsequently
undergone periodic amendment.2 5 They are published in the United
States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual [hereinafter Guidelines Manual]2 6
The SRA calls for the Commission's guidelines to consider the
nature and seriousness of the offense, as well as the history and characteristics of the defendant. In addition, the Commision's guidelines
should embody the following purposes of criminal sentencing: promotion of respect for the law, just punishment for the offense (i.e.,
proportionality), adequate deterrence, protection of the public from
the defendant's future criminal activity, and principles of rehabilitation.27 The SRA further called for the Commission to issue "general
policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other
28
aspect of sentencing" that would further the above purposes.
The introduction to the Guidelines Manual contains these congressionally mandated policy statements. 29 There, the Commission
identifies Congress' three main objectives in sentencing reform. The
first is honesty, encompassing both the reduction of the disparity between time sentenced and actual time served, and clarification, by
eliminating obscurity as to which sources have informed the sentencing.3 0 The second objective is uniformity, which focuses on achieving
23
24

28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A)-(C) (1988).

26

U.S.S.G.

The Commission was to prepare and present its guidelines to Congress by April
1987. The guidelines were to take effect six months later, absent congressional action. 28
U.S.C. § 994(p).
For sharp criticism of the sentencing commission's guideline promulgation methodology, see Parent, supra note 14, at 1788 ("But the federal Commission took an ideological,
even political, approach to guideline development that disavowed constraints, suppressed
discussions of purpose, closed decisionmaking to interested and affected parties, and departed substantially from past sentencing norms.").
25
28 U.S.C 994(p) calls for the Commission to submit guideline amendments to Congress to take effect "no earlier than 180 days after being so submitted ... except to the
extent that the effective date is revised or the amendment is otherwise modified or disapproved by Act of Congress."
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2) (1990). Rehabilitation has been virtually abandoned as goal of sentencing in the SRA. See Michael Vitiello, ReconsideringRehabilitation, 65
TUL. L. Ray. 1011, 1027-32 (1991) (advocating legislative abandonment of the rehabilitative model).
28
28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (1990).
29
U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A, intro.
30 Id. This Note subsumes the mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988) that "[t]he
court, at the time of sentencing shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of
the particular sentence," under the congressional goal of honesty in sentencing. Freed
characterizes this as a call for candor, embodied in the goal enumerated by the guidelines
that "the Guidelines Manua4 together with the underlying statute .... will hold the judge
accountable for every sentencing choice. He must state reasons for each sentence, includ27
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parity between the federal courts in sentencing like offenders for like
criminal conduct.3 1 The third goal is proportionality, which is to be
accomplished by sentencing defendants in a manner consistent with
32
the severity of of their particular criminal conduct.
In its policy statement, the Commission also acknowledges the
tension between underlying philosophies of criminal punishment.
The statement claims that there is general agreement that the ultimate aim of law and punishment is crime control. Beyond this threshold, however, the Commission finds that consensus breaks down. The
Commission identifies a rift between proponents of the principle of
'just deserts," 33 who call for scaling punishment to "the offender's
culpability and resulting harms," and those who advocate the imposition of punishment on the basis of "practical 'crime control'
34
considerations.
Ultimately, the Commission eschews (or at least declines to acknowledge) choosing between these philosophies, claiming that any
choice would be profoundly difficult and that either choice would undercut the "widespread acceptance" that effective guideline implementation requires. It adds hopefully that "as a practical matter, in
most sentencing decisions both philosophies may prove consistent
35
with the same result."
ing a 'specific reason' for some sentences, and his decision is subject to appellate scrutiny."
(citations omitted). Freed, supra note 5, at 1697. See also FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES,
supra note 8, at 16 (quoting Learned Hand's observation: "[h]ere I am an old man in a
long nightgown making muffled noises at people who may be no worse than I am"); Milton
Heumann, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and NegotiatedJustice, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP.
223, 225 (1991) (characterizing the pre-guideline sentencer, who was not required to articulate reasoning supporting his sentence, as a "black box" sentencer, completely unconstrained and uncircumscribed in her sentencing choices).
31
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro.
32
Id.
33
One commentator identifies the traditional definition of retribution and the parallel underlying principle ofjust deserts as the notion that" 'criminalbehavior constitute [s] a
violation of the moral or natural order... and, having offended that order, require[s]
payment of some kind'. Therefore, a criminal is punished because he or she 'deserves' it.
This justification for punishment is appropriately called the principle of 'just deserts.' "
David A. Starkweather, The Retributive Theory of 'JustDeserts" and Victim Participationin Plea
Bargaining,67 IND. LJ. 853, 855 (1992) (quoting Paul T.Jensen, A ChristianDefense of Retribution, 7 CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC'Y Q. 11 (1986)). See Sperry, supra note 7, at 1277-1281 (discussing retribution as a philosophical model). Cf Starkweather, supra (setting forth a
comprehensive discussion of a victim's relevance at sentencing under ajust deserts theory
of retribution and arguing that under this theory, victim participation in the plea bargaining process is not only appropriate but desirable). See generally SINGER, supra note 4 (discussing sentencing based on just deserts).
34
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro.
35 Id. at 3. See von Hirsch, supra note 12, at 367 for a discussion of the negative
effects of the sentencing commission's abdication of its duty to select a rationale. Von
Hirsch notes that traditional discretionary sentencing concealed the need for a rationale,
while sentencing guidelines bring it into sharp relief: "Without the guidance of a coherent
rationale, the choice of a particular set of rules-imprisonment for this kind of case, proba-
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This Note argues that, whether or not the lack of an underlying
philosophy of punishment affects "most sentencing decisions," individual philosophies may affect the willingness ofjudges to identify victims as vulnerable for the purposes of applying section 3A1.1.
Idiosyncratic identification of guideline vulnerability3 6 ultimately undermines both the guidelines' stated goal of proportionality in sentencing and the congressionally mandated goal of uniformity.3 7 To
the extent that this Note identifies divergent application of the enhancement among circuits, it identifies the failure of the guidelines to
fulfill these mandates.
B.

The Sentence Computation Process Under the Guidelines

Theoretically, application of the guidelines is a mechanical process. The sentencing judge is instructed to follow the general application principles contained in the introductory chapter of the Guidelines
Manual,3 In reality, application calls for a great deal ofjudicial decision-making as the sentencing judge identifies the component parts
that will yield the fully calculated sentence. 39
The first step is the selection of the applicable guideline section
from Chapter two of the Guidelines Manual. This is done by referencing the statutory index, which cross-references federal statutes with
guideline sections. 40 Once selected, the guideline section provides a
base offense level, which, in turn, is adjusted by specific offense characteristics contained in that guideline section.
tion for that kind-is arbitrary it might produce more consistent outcomes, but it is not
apparent why outcomes are more effective or more just." Id. at 370-71. See also Steven P.
Lab, PotentialDeterrentEffects of the Guidelines, in THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: IMPLICA.
TIONS FOR CRIMINALJusTICE 32, 33 (DeanJ. Champion ed., 1989) ("e]ven a cursory reading of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines shows which rationale is dominant. While the
Commission has paid lip service to the goals of deterrence and incapacitation, ...
the
focus is almost exclusively on just deserts.' ").
36 "[Sentencers] have discovered that 'creative interpretation' of the guidelines can
outflank reform rhetoric and afford them substantial discretion." Alschuler, supra note 14,
at 925.
37 Talbert, supra note 7, at 211-219 (discussing the effect of victim participation at
sentencing on the goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
38 U.S.S.G. § 1BI.1.
39 As one commentator notes:
Each "sentencer" makes critical choices affecting the sentence in the particular case, and-ultimately-the level of disparity in the sentencing system.
A sentence emerges not only from the sequential stages in establishing a
sentencing range or modifying it, but from variations in discretionary actions taken by different individuals who play the designated roles within
each stage.
Freed, supra note 5, at 1696.
40 U.S.S.G. App. A. See also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 (describing the rules and exceptions
applicable to selecting the appropriate offense guideline section).
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For example, in the statutory index, the federal offense of interference with housing rights by means of force or threat of force resulting in bodily injury, codified at 42 U.S.C § 3631 (b) (1), corresponds to
guideline section 2H1.3, Use of Force or Threat ofForce to Deny Benefits or
Rights in Furtheranceof Discrimination,Damage to Religious Real Property.
This guideline provides a base offense level of ten if no injury occurred and fifteen if injury occurred. The section also refers to a "specific offense characteristic," e.g., "[i]f the defendant was a public
official at the time of the offense, increase by 4 levels." Assuming the
violation involved an injury to the victim and a public official was the
perpetrator, this computation would result in an adjusted base offense
level of nineteen.
The sentencer then applies the various sections of Chapter Three
of the Guidelines Manual to the adjusted base offense level. Chapter
three provides adjustments for factors involving the characteristics of
the victims, 4 1 the role that the defendant played in the offense, 4 2 and

any obstruction of the proceedings by the defendant.43 It is at this
stage in the process that the sentencer considers section 3AL.1, the
vulnerable victim enhancement. If applied, the enhancement increases the offense level by two. The court then repeats these steps
for multiple offense convictions. A criminal history category is then
determined separately from the offense level calculation, based on
prior convictions and other considerations, including "career of44
fender" and "criminal livelihood" determinations by the court.
Finally, the sentencer uses separate calculations to compute a sentencing range based on their intersection on a sentencing table contained in Chapter Five of the Guidelines Manual.45 This range is
considered in light of the applicability of options contained in Chapter five, which include probation, restitution, imprisonment, community confinement and fines. 46 After deciding whether either an

upward or downward departure is appropriate, (a step neither freely
allowed nor lightly taken),47 the court must sentence the defendant
within the calculated range.
41

U.S.S.G. § 3Al.1-3A1.3.

42

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1-3B1.4.

43
44
45
46

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
U.S.S.G. ch. 4.
U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.
U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1-5G1.3.

47 A judge's power to depart from a sentencing range is carefully circumscribed
under the guidelines and departure is strictly reviewed at the appellate level. But see
United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298 (2nd Cir.), 1309, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct., 2933 (1993)
(advocating departure based on offender characteristics because "departure in the appropriate case is essential to the satisfactory functioning of the sentencing system"). For a
discussion of departure under the guidelines, see Ellingstad, supra note 15; Shapiro, supra
note 15; Lupkin, supra note 15.
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Continuing the above example of interference with housing
rights, the base offense level of nineteen for a defendant with no criminal history would mandate a sentence within a range of thirty to
thirty-seven months. Had this civil rights offense involved a vulnerable
victim under section 3A1.1, the adjusted base offense level of twentyone would allow a sentence ranging from thirty-seven to forty-six
months. Application of section 3A1.1 can increase the available sentencing range from as little as two months to as much as seventy-eight
months, depending upon the base sentencing range.
C.

Section 3A1.1; The Vulnerable Victim Enhancement
Particularized

The question of a crime victim's role at sentencing is as old as
society's assumption of responsibility for the well-being and safety of
its constituents and its removal of dispute resolution from the realm
of self-help. 48 The familiar Biblical Lex Talionis, the law of "eye for
eye, tooth for tooth,1 49 is simply an ancient victim-in-sentencing stat-

ute.50 Recently, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has struggled
to define the role of victim impact evidence in the capital sentencing
process. 5 1
48 For an interesting thumb-nail sketch of the historic role of victims at sentencing see
ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATVE SENTENCING: A PRACrTIONER'S GUIDE § 5.02 (1988). Klein
concludes by discussing the effects of admitting the testimony of a murder victim's survivor
by noting that "[t]he long-term effect of the introduction of victims ... into the criminal
justice system is unknown at present" Id. at 143. See generally Howard C. Rubel, Victim
Participationin Sentencing Proceedings,28 C iM. L.Q. 226 (1986). Rubel outlines the theory
that the state "appropriates" conflicts from victims in an effort to avoid the negative of the
increased violence that accompanies individual revenge. Id. at 239. Interestingly, Rubel
sees the subjective factors of both the "vengeful" victim and the "merciful" victim as inputs
to be avoided, through judicial distance, because they lead to general sentencing inequities, thereby undermining the goal of uniformity. Id. at 248-9. But seeJAMEs M. BURNS &
JOSEPH S. MATTINA, SENTENCING 205-07 (1978) (discussing the role of victims at sentencing,
calling for reform and recounting anecdotally the beneficial impact of a "merciful" victim
at sentencing).
49 Exodus 22:24 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible).
50
See Exodus 21:23; 24 Deuteronomy 19:21; Leviticus 24:20. Lex Talionis is traditionally
seen as "not an expression of vengeance but a limitation upon measureless vengeance."
THE NEv OXFORD ANNOTATED BmLE 94 n.22-25. But see Calum Carmicheal, BiblicalLaws of
Talion, 9 HEBREW ANN. REv. 107 (1985). Carmicheal traces the derivation, as rules of law,
of the Exodus and Deuteronomy Lex Talisionfrom earlier biblical narratives. Carmicheal's
conclusion that "the talionic formula.., applies to the victim in question and not to types
of victim who differ according to injuries sustained," id. at 118, gives the biblical statute a
reading that parallels precisely this Note's view of§ 3A1.1. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
51 See Sperry, supra note 7, at 1281-1309 for a cogent description and analysis of
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)
and Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct 2597 (1991). These three decisions reflect the Supreme
Court's vacillating view of victim impact evidence. Booth and Gathershold that the admission of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial violates the Eighth
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The vulnerable victim enhancement is distinguishable, however,
in both process and goals, from most codified and common-law methods of enabling victims to inform penalty proceedings. Section 3A1.1
seeks neither to assess, nor to factor into sentencing, the impact of a
defendant's criminal conduct on the victim. 5 2 Nor does the enhance-

ment allow judicial consideration of a victim's perspective when determining the appropriate level of punishment to impose at sentencing.
Section 3Al.1 seeks only to identify particularly vulnerable victims and
to inform the court about the nature of the defendant by focusing
solely on the criminal conduct at issue.
The vulnerable victim adjustment of the sentencing guidelines
reads as follows:
§ 3A1.1 Vulnerable Victim
If the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the
offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the
criminal conduct, increase by 2 levels.
Commentary
Application Notes:
1. This adjustment applies to offenses where an unusually vulnerable victim is made a target of criminal activity by the defendant.
The adjustment would apply, for example, in a fraud case where the
defendant marketed an ineffective cancer cure or in a robbery
where the defendant selected a handicapped victim. But it would
not apply in a case where the defendant sold fraudulent securities
by mail to the general public and one of the victims happened to be
senile. Similarly, for example, a bank teller is not an unusually vul53
nerable victim solely by virtue of the teller's position in a bank.
2. Do not apply this adjustment if the offense guideline specifically
incorporates this factor. For example, where the offense guideline
provides an enhancement for the age of the victim, this guideline
should not be applied unless the victim was unusually vulnerable for
54
reasons unrelated to age.
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Ultimately, Payne upholds the admissibility of such evidence.
52 See Hellerstein, supra note 6, at 400-05 (discussing the relationship between victim
impact statements and the federal sentencing guidelines).
53 See infra note 116 and accompanying text for commentary on the bank teller example provided in Application Note 2. See generally infra notes 110-22 and accompanying
text.
54 U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1. The adjustment has been amended three times since its inception. On November 1, 1989 the section itself was amended by replacing the language "the
victim" wherever it appeared with the language "a victim." The section of the Commentary
captioned "Application Notes, Note 1" was amended by deleting the language "any offense
where the victim's vulnerability played any part in the defendant's decision to commit the
offense," and inserting "offenses where an unusually vulnerable victim is made a target of
criminal activity by the defendant"; and deleting "sold fraudulent securities to the general
public and one of the purchasers," and inserting "sold fraudulent securities by mall to the
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1. Enhancement Purpose and the Role of the Victim
Notwithstanding its apparent focus, this sentencing enhancement
neither depends on nor inquires into the harm done to the victim of
criminal conduct. The decision whether to apply the adjustment is
not a function of calibrating a defendant's sentence to a particular
victim's suffering. Instead, a sentencer's section 3A1.1 interest in the
victim concerns only the victim's role as a target55 of the relevant criminal conduct. As noted in United States v. Long,56 "[t]he section does
not authorize sentence enhancement based on the severity of the victim's suffering. A victim's testimony can be relevant to the sentencing
courts determination of "vulnerability," but only to the extent that the
victim discusses facts that might have been known to [the] defendant
....
"57 The enhancement seeks to identify instances where a particularly vulnerable victim was the object of the criminal activity, thereby
establishing that the defendant has "show[n] the extra measure of
criminal depravity which section 3A1.1 intends to more severely punish."5 8 The victim's characteristics serve only to illustrate the defendant's depraved nature, allowing the sentencer to apply that "extra
general public and one of the victims." These amendments were intended to "clarify the
guideline and commentary." U.S.S.G., App. C, amend. 245 (1990).
On November 1, 1990 the section of the Commentary captioned "Application Notes,
Note 2" was amended by inserting the complete second sentence, as it now appears. This
amendment was intended to "clarif[y] the application of § 3A1.1." U.S.S.G., App. C,
amend. 344.
On November 1, 1992 the section of the Commentary captioned "Application Notes,
Note 1" was amended by inserting the complete last sentence, as it now appears. This
amendment "clarifie [d] the circumstances in which the vulnerable victim adjustment is intended to be applied." U.S.S.G., App. C, amend. 454. See infra note 117 and accompanying text for commentary on this amendment.
55 See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, Comment (n.1).
56
935 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1991).
57 Id. at 1211. See also United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 609 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 861 (1989) (holding sentence of defendant convicted of fraud was properly enhanced where defendant used dead companion's credit card after burning his
corpse, and noting that "whether a corpse may suffer harm is irrelevant" because section
3A1.1 does not require harm).
58
United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329, 1335 (5th Cir. 1990).
Of course, the conclusion that the guideline focuses on the offense to inform the
court about the offender's "depravity" is a judicial conclusion drawn from the principle of
conduct-scrutiny, which the guideline mandates. One commentator discerns the guideline's fixation on the offense differently: "Apparently, the Commission's philosophy of
criminal sentencing is to shape the sentence to the crime, rather than to the offender.
This policy directly contradicts Congress' desire to maintain individualized sentencing."
Lay, supra note 14, at 1769.
The question was similarly asked and answered by sitting United States DistrictJudge
Orinda D. Evans: "In Sentencing should you focus more on the characteristics of the
crime or the characteristics of the criminal? And I think this is an issue that the [SEA] has
decided in favor of focusing on the characteristics of the crime. And I suppose reasonable
minds can differ, but that is something where [we] judges tend to think differently." Atlanta Roundtable: Views From the Bench, 1 Fed. Sent. Rep. 320, 322-3 (1988).
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dollop of punishment"5 9 to those defendants identified as selecting
particularly vulnerable victims as the targets of their criminal conduct.
Nowhere is the victim's paradoxical "absence" from section 3A1.1
sentencing more apparent than in United States v. Depew. 60 In Depew, a
case of "unspeakable evil and tragedy narrowly averted," 61 a defendant
who conspired to kidnap a young male to produce a sex-snuff film, in
which a boy was to be sexually tortured and murdered, was convicted
of conspiracy to kidnap and exploit a minor in a sexually explicit film.
Police detected the nascent scheme thwarted and the defendants during the conspiracy phase. The defendants had not yet "selected" a
particular young male to victimize. Despite the absence of an actual
victim, the court found that the defendant's sentence was properly
62
enhanced through application of the vulnerable victim adjustment.
Noting that "an innocent twelve year old boy was, from the beginning
of the conspiracy, to be the target of the crime," the court held that
"[a] boy of such age would certainly be 'unusually vulnerable,' if he fell
63
into the hands of the appellant."
Application of the vulnerable victim enhancement to a
conspiracy defendant whose intended criminal act never occurred,
and whose conduct had no victim, highlights the enhancement's intended purpose. Proper application of section 3Al.1's principles will
identify those defendants who target victims that they knew, or had
reason to know, were particularly vulnerable to their criminal conduct. The enhancement does not seek to calibrate sentencing on the
basis of the harm caused by the criminal conduct. Rather, it seeks to
64
identify and punish particularly heinous offenders.
59 United Sates v. Newman, 965 F.2d 206, 212 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 470
(1992).
60 932 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 210 (1991).
61 Id. at 326.

62 Note that the adjustment can only be applied to either kidnapping conspiracy or
first degree murder; conspiracy to exploit a minor in a sexually explicit film would be
viewed as incorporating the victim's age, (the grounds for the finding of vulnerability),
into the offense guideline, and so application of § 3A1.1 would be precluded by its own
terms: "Do not apply this adjustment if the offense guideline specifically incorporates this
factor." U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, comment. (n.2). See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text for
further discussion of Commentary Note 2.
63

64

Depew,

932 F.2d at 330.

See also United States v. Yount, 960 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
although bank was victim of money laundering, embezzling and misapplication of funds,
and that in reimbursing victims the bank ultimately became the victim, the fact that defendant embezzled from very old and infirm trust account holders who were unable to manage their own affairs supported the application of the vulnerable victim enhancement). Cf
United States v. Paslay, 971 F.2d 667 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that although alleged victims were also accomplices, there was no reason why vulnerable accomplices could not be
subsumed under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1). See also United States v. Williams, 963 F.2d 374 (6th
Cir. 1992) (opinion available in Westlaw) (declining to decide, because issue was not properly raised at trial, whether passengers of defendant convicted of bringing illegal aliens
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Necessarily Broad Language v. the Desire to Limit Discretion

As noted earlier, the difficulty in crafting such an enhancement
lies in identifying factors broadly applicable across the full spectrum
of criminal conduct. 65 The enhancement language must avoid vagueness. It must simultaneously disencumber, yet shape and limit the
sentencing court's discretion to identify "particular" vulnerability
when sentencing defendants whose offenses may vary widely between
66
victim, context and criminal conduct.
In United States v. Boult,67 the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that the language of the enhancement was unconstitutionally
vague. After reviewing the factors cited by the guideline ("age, physical or mental disability or particular susceptibility") ,68 the court found
that, taken as a whole, section 3AI.1's language sufficiently defined its
applicable fact pattern: "[w] e cannot conclude that it is so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
69
and differ as to its application."
While the vagueness impediment has been addressed and disposed of by at least one circuit, the tension over appropriate sentencing discretion continues. One means of gauging the discretion
inherent in the enhancement is to look at the standard of appellate
review that challenged enhancement determinations undergo. The
70
Fifth Circuit addressed this question in United States v. Mejia-Orosco,
resolving it squarely in favor of district court discretion.
In Mejia-Orosco, a defendant petitioning for rehearing urged the
Fifth Circuit to adopt a higher standard of appellate review in lieu of
the "clearly erroneous" standard that had been applied to his first apinto United States were "victims" of offense, court finds they were vulnerable victims within
meaning of U.S.S.G. 3A1.1). But see United States v. Velasquez-Mercado, 872 F.2d 632, 636,
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 866 (1989) (female illegal aliens were smuggled and molested by defendant are more properly considered "customers" than "victims" of defendant illegal
transporter).
65
"Sentencing commissions can quantify harmi more easily than they can quantify
circumstances." Alschuler, supra, note 14 at 915. See also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
66
"Yet, disparity persists on a more limited scale as a result of differing approaches to
ambiguous Guidelines provisions." Karle & Sager, supra note 8, at 444. See alsoJAc.K M.
KRESS, PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE: THsE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES

195-97 (1980). Discussing the codification of victims as an offense variable in guideline
sentencing, Kress notes "[a] danger with using this variable is that, unless very carefully
phrased, the coding may become subjective." Id. at 197.
67 905 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1990).
68 U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1.
69 Boult 905 F.2d at 1140. For a general discussion of the constitutionality of the
guidelines, see The Constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Reform Act After Mistretta v.
United States, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 683 (1990).
70 868 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989).
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peal. 7 ' To buttress his argument for less deference to district court
determinations, the defendant focused on language in the Congressional Record discussing standards of appellate review, using section
3A1.1 as an illustration. The Congressional Record analysis suggested
that, while age and physical ailments might be termed "objective facts"
and thereby insulated from close review under the "clearly erroneous"
standard, "vulnerability" would be a "subjective" judgment, perhaps
72
requiring a different, closer appellate review.
The Fifth Circuit, while pointing out the difficulties of judicial
reliance on legislative history, rejected both the logic and the recommendation of the Congressional Record's analysis. In language oftquoted in subsequent section 3A1.1 decisions, the court wrote:
[M]atters such as "age" or "physical ailments" are the sort of facts
which may effectively be reviewed by an appellate court. ...On the

other hand, "vulnerability" is the sort of fact which the trial court is
peculiarly well positioned to gauge, . . . vulnerability is a complex
fact dependent upon a number of characteristics... not reducible
to a calculation of the victim's age or to a diagnosis of the victim's
disease. 7 3
Characterizing the vulnerability finding as one of "fact" should
theoretically engender review for "clear error." However, most circuits, many simultaneously citing Mejia-Orosco's language with approval, expressly or implicitly review a section 3A1.1 determination as
a mixed question of fact and law: the underlying factual predicates
are reviewed for clear error, while the reasoning applied to the facts
ultimately resulting in the identification of a victim as particularly vulnerable is generally considered a question of law, engendering de
novo review.7 4
71 In applying this standard, the lower court had determined issues unrelated to section 3A1.1.
72
Mia-Orosco, 868 F.2d at 809.
73
Id. at 807 (emphasis added).
74
See United States v. Long, 935 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1991), where the Eleventh Circuit writes: "The Fifth Circuit has suggested that it believes the applicability of § 3A1.1 to
be a purely factualdetermination. While we decline to adopt tWTh1rconclusion, we agree with
that court's observation that 'ajudgement as to vulnerability4 not reducible to a calculation of the victim's age or a diagnosis of the victim's disease. "I..
Id. at 1211 (emphasis
added). See also United States v. Caterino, 957 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 129 (1992) (reviewing guideline interpretation de novo, but subjectirig determinations
of vulnerability to a "due deference" standard). But see United States v. Clark, 956 F.2d 279
(10th Cir. 1992) (opinion available in Westlaw) (vulnerability question of fact reviewed for
clear error); United States v. Sutherland, 955 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1992) (vulnerability ig a
question of fact reviewed for clear error). Cf.United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94 (1st
Cir. 1991) ("[L]egal interpretation and application of sentencing guidelines is subject to
plenary review" when reversing guideline application); United States v. Pavao, 948 F.2d 74
(1st Cir. 1991) ("Clearly erroneous" standard applied as court affirms guideline
application).
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Preclusion, as Vulnerability Factors, of Characteristics "Counted"
in the Underlying Offense Guideline

Another consideration under section 3A1.1 enhancement is the
mandate that courts "not apply this adjustment if the offense guideline specifically incorporates... [the] factor."75 The clearest example
of this caveat is the one provided by the guideline itself: victim age.
In United States v. Plaza-Garcia,7 6 the First Circuit reversed a district
court's section 3A1 .1 enhancement of a sentence under guideline section 2G2.1, (sexual exploitation of a minor).7 7 The court properly
held that the victim's age was specifically incorporated into the offense guideline, meaning that the Sentencing Commission had taken
the factor into account when calculating the base offense level; thus
section 3A1.1 was inapplicable by its own terms.
Other circuits have been less rigorous in observing this restriction, particularly in the context of sexually abused children. The
cases clearly show the courts straining against the limits imposed on
their discretion when faced with conduct so egregious that it traditionally invited the strongest sentences in the court's power. In United
States v. Poncho,78 a defendant convicted of sexual abuse of a minor
argued that the sentencing court had "double counted" by relying on
"age" as a vulnerability factor, where the commentary of the offense
guideline upon which his sentence was computed described his con79
duct as "sexual acts lawful but for a victims' age."
The Tenth Circuit affirmed sentence enhancement, holding that
application would have been impermissible if it had been predicated
on age alone. The court found that the sentencing court had relied
on the "victim's age, and the time and place of the sexual abuse," as
indicated in the judge's statement at the sentencing hearing.8 0 The
circuit court further reached sua sponte into the record and buttressed the enhancement based on the victim's niece-uncle relation
with her abuser. Directly contradicting the enhancement's unambiguous language, the circuit court wrote that "the complete exclusion of
age as one of the circumstances would be contrary to common sense,
75
76

U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, comment.(n.2).
914 F.2d 345 (1st Cir. 1990).

77

U.S.S.G § 2G2.1.

78

968 F.2d 22, (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 985 (1993) (opinion available

in Westlaw). See also United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming
application against defendant convicted of sexual exploitation of minor who argued sentence was improperly enhanced because charged substantive offenses included the same
elements as the vulnerability enhancement; section 3A1.1 application nominally relied on
the defendant's drugging of the victim, which rendered the victim vulnerable).
79
U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2 Criminal Sexual Abuse of a Minor, Background Commentary.
80 Poncho,968 F.2d 22 at **1 (opinion available in Westlaw).
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given the infinite variety of circumstances in which a forty-six year old
's
man may abuse a pre-adolescent child."'
Contrary to common sense or not, enhancement based on the
victim's age, where the underlying offense guideline clearly incorporates age and the enhancement itself forbids use of the factor in this
context, is manifestly contrary to the prescriptions of the guidelines.
Such application forcefully illustrates the tension between attempts to
limit discretion and the desires of individual judges' to punish that
behavior that they consider most heinous. The question of whether a
vulnerability factor has been incorporated into a particular base offense level has been the subject of appeals of sentences for a variety of
82
criminal conduct.
4.

Correct Vulnerable Victim Enhancement Illustrated

Beyond these threshold considerations, the guidelines as a whole
mandate strict application parameters, seeking to ensure that vulnerability is found and sentences thereby enhanced on a principled basis.
Because the enhancement is of necessity drafted in generalities, its
application is best illustrated through an example. The enhancement
in United States v. Hershkowitz83 reflects a principled, thoughtful and
measured use of the vulnerable victim enhancement. The Second
Circuit's analysis is consistent with both the enhancement's plain language and the recommendations in Parts II and III of this Note.
In Hershkowitz, a detention enforcement officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service appealed application of section 3A1.1
following his plea of guilty to assaulting an immigration detainee
while acting under color of state law.8 4 The defendant attacked and
assaulted an immigration detainee in the company of four other
guards, slapping and punching the victim in the face, chest and stomach.8 5 The sentencing court found that the detainee was a vulnerable
81 Id.
82 See United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503 (2d Cir. 1992) (Prisoner's status as
a victim not factored into the offense level for "Civil Rights Violation Committed by Official Acting Under Color of Law"); United States v. Salyer, 893 F.2d 113 (6th Cir.
1989) (race not a factor incorporated in guideline for conspiracy to violate rights of a citizen); United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1992) (section 3Al.1 enhancement of
sentence for interstate transportation of minor for purpose of prostitution held to be
proper where defendant knew of 16 year old victim's troubled childhood, history of sexual
abuse and current placement in group home); United States v. Clark, 956 F.2d 279 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3010 (1992) (opinion available in Westlaw) (application of
section 3A1.1 not impermissible double counting when imposed with section 3B1.3 enhancement for abuse of position of trust, where defendant sexually assaulted sixteen year

old inmate).
83
968 F.2d 1503 (2d Cir. 1992).
84
The enforcement officer violated 18 U.S.C. § 241, which prohibits a "Civil Rights
Violation Under Color of Law."
85 Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d at 1504.
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victim and the Second Circuit affirmed enhancement application to
the defendant's sentence.
The defendant first argued that the "vulnerability of the detainee
was merely a result of [defendant's] status as a guard,"8 6 a factor already accounted for at sentencing by the applicable guideline offense
level: "Civil Rights Violation Committed by Official Acting Under
Color of Law."8 7 The defendant maintained that by using an incorporated factor to find vulnerability, the sentencing court had engaged in
impermissible double counting, forbidden by the plain language of
88
the enhancement.
The Circuit Court found that the source of victim's particularsusceptibility was his status as a prisoner in the custody of, and surrounded by, five guards, when the assault occurred; thus the
sentencing court had taken into account "considerations... distinct
from and in addition to the fact that defendant's actions were taken
under color of law."8 9 The court held that "acting under color of law"
did not necessarily contemplate a victim who was in custody, under
the defendant's control, and surrounded by other officers, whose
presence increased the coercive nature of the attack. 90 Perceiving
these as the factors that the sentencing court had relied on in finding
particularvulnerability,the circuit court held that these factors were not
incorporated into the underlying offense guideline. 9 '
The defendant next argued that section 3A1.1 application could
only be properly premised on those factors inherent in the victim (i.e.
age or physical condition) that were likely to make that person particularly susceptible to the illegal conduct, and not the circumstances
surrounding the criminal conduct. 92 While acknowledging that the
enhancement listed factors inherent in victims as examples tending to
show vulnerability, the Second Circuit noted that the enhancement
also provides for application where the defendant was "otherwise particularly susceptible," without limitation as to what factors could be
considered. 93 The court properly acknowledged that "[w]hile the focus must remain on the victim's individual vulnerability, 94 the totality
of the circumstances, including the status of the victim and the nature
86

87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 1505.
U.S.S.G. § 2H1.4.
See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d at 1505.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1506.

93 Id.
94 Id. at 1506 (citing U.S. v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450, 1455 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 225 (1991)).
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of the crime, must be taken into account in determining applicability
of the vulnerable victim enhancement." 95
By expressly acknowledging that the inquiry centered around
"the victim's individual vulnerability," the court avoided using judicial
shorthand to improperly identify vulnerability in an unprincipled or
unarticulated manner. Instead, the Second Circuit conducted a particularized inquiry into the conduct, the context, and the victim,
thereby avoiding the three types of improper application invited by
Hershkowitz's facts: holding that by virtue of their status as prisoners,
detainees were categorically vulnerable; concluding that prisoners
were per se vulnerable victims to assaults by guards; or asserting that
the susceptibility of prisoners to assaults by detention officers could
alone support a finding of vulnerability sufficient to trigger section
3A1.1 enhancement.
The relevant factors in this case were the victim's status as a detainee and the coercive presence of four other guards. The court provided articulated reasoning in support of its finding that these factors
rendered the victim particularly vulnerable to the criminal conduct.
Only this type of articulated and particularized inquiry can ensure the
principled identification of vulnerability that is necessary to further
the avowed congressional goals of proportionality, honesty, and uniformity under the guidelines. Finding vulnerability without such an
analysis, through the truncated inquiries described above, would ultimately lead to disproportionate sentences, obscurity and dishonesty
with regard to the factors that determined the sentence, and, finally,
idiosyncractic and discretionary findings of vulnerability that would
undermine the guidelines' primary goal of uniformity in federal
sentencing.
The final contention of the defendant in Hershkowitz was that the
proper application of the enhancement required the sentencing court
to find that the victim's particular vulnerability had motivated the defendant to seek out the victim as a target of his criminal conduct. 96
The court rejected the proposition that section 3A1.1 required vulnerability to play a role in the defendant's decision to target his victim.
Noting that the enhancement applied where the defendant "knew or
should have known" that the victim was particularly vulnerable, the
court held that it was of no consequence whether the defendant actually knew of the particular vulnerability, let alone whether the vulnera-

95
Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d at 1505. See also United States v. Redhouse, 916 F.2d 717 (9th
Cir. 1990) (opinion available in Westlaw) (holding that victim who was gang-raped at night

and again the next morning was rendered more vulnerable to second attack by effects of
first attack).
96 Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d at 1506.
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bility caused defendant to target his victim. 97 The court held that the
defendant in Hershkowitz must have known that his victim could not
resist his assault, especially when committed in the presence of the
98
defendant's fellow officers.
Hershkowitz represents a principled and measured application of
the enhancement provision in three ways: the Second Circuit conducted a particularized inquiry before finding particular vulnerability;
the court resisted finding "per se" vulnerability of particular victims as
to particular criminal conduct; and the court rejected the purported
requirement that the victim's vulnerability must have motivated the
defendant to target his victim. The following part of this Note contrasts cases that properly and improperly address these problem areas
of vulnerable victim enhancement, and further identifies and advocates application principles that will result in principled and measured vulnerable victim enhancement.
II
PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS IN ENHANCEMENT APPLICATION

Section II explores the three enhancement principles identified
in Hershkowitz.99 First, proper application of the vulnerable victim enhancement requires an articulated finding of particularvulnerability
not present in all victims of the offense in question. Second, the requirement that a victim's particular vulnerability have motivated a defendant to select that victim as a target of his criminal conduct is
unwarranted by the enhancement. Third, judicial designation of per
se, as a matter of law vulnerability, within broad classes of victims of
criminal conduct with shared characteristics, is precluded by the requirement of a specific finding of vulnerability, unique to the victim
under the facts and circumstances of each case. This Section contrasts
court decisions that have recognized and adhered to these principles
with decisions that have not, and identifies the negative consequences
which follow from improper enhancement application.
A.

The Requirement of Articulated Findings of "Particular
Vulnerability" Not Present in all Victims of the Criminal
Conduct

This section focuses on the section 3A1.1 requirement of particularvulnerability unique to some victims of the criminal conduct being
sentenced. Related to particular vulnerability is the requirement that
sentencing courts not only list the factors that they find constitute par97
98
99

Id
Id.
See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
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ticular vulnerability, but also articulate reasons in support of their
finding of vulnerability based on those identified factors. Particular
vulnerability is required both by the plain language of section 3A1.1,
and by the guidelines' underlying goal of proportionality. 10 0 The requirement that sentencing courts articulate their reasoning also supports the guidelines' goal of honesty and candor in sentencing. 10 '
The Fifth Circuit has identified and articulated this "particular
vulnerability" requirement clearly, correctly and concisely. In United
States v. Moree,10 2 the court reversed the district court's enhancement
of a sentence for conspiring and endeavoring to obstruct justice.' 0 3
The defendant had offered to "fix" the case of a Mississippi highway
commissioner indicted on eleven counts of extortion, bribery and tax
evasion.' 0 4 The court below found that the commissioner was a vulnerable victim because his indictment rendered him particularly susceptible to the defendant's criminal conduct. 10 5 In reversing the
district court's application, the Fifth Circuit held that the "vulnerability that triggers § 3A1.1 must be an 'unusual' vulnerability which is
present in only some victims of that type of crime. Otherwise defendants' choice of a likely victim does not show the extra measure of criminal depravity which § 3A1.1 intends to more severely punish." 10 6
Holding that "a condition that occurs as a necessary prerequisite to
the commission of a crime cannot constitute an enhancing factor
under 3A1.1,'

07

the court distinguished conditions of susceptibility

that give rise to a "vulnerability [that] made the attempted crime possible" from those which could properly serve as a foundation for a sentencing court's identification of "an unusually vulnerable victim."' 0 8
The Moree court held that the highway commissioner's indictment was properly categorized as the kind of susceptibility that made
the crime possible. 10 9 This type of vulnerability could not support an
application of the enhancement. The court sought to clarify the distinction through examples, stating that "neither a businessman nor a
bank should be considered unusually vulnerable to armed robbery
merely because the bank robber knows they have cash on hand or may
have some breach in their security system."" 0
100
101
102

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
897 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1990).
at 1336.

105
106

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 1336.

109
11o

Id.

103
104

Id.

at 1331.
at 1336.

at 1335.
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This reasoning stands in sharp contrast to that of the Eleventh
Circuit in the now overruled"' United States v. Jones.112 In Jones, the
circuit court affirmed the district court's application of section 3A1.1
to a defendant sentenced for bank larceny, holding that "a bank teller
was particularly susceptible to the offense of larceny."" 3 The defendant argued on appeal that tellers, trained to deal with thieves and
surrounded by cages, cameras, alarms and security personnel, were
actually less vulnerable than the average larceny victim.11 4 The court

cryptically responded that "we think [the defendant] confuses vulnerability of the victim with susceptibility to the criminal conduct."" 5 The
court expalined that because tellers are stationed in areas designed
for public access and transact business with customers, it is difficult for
them to elude thieves. Furthermore, because they are known to han111 United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (10th Cir. 1993), reo', United States v.
Morrill, 963 F.2d 386, (10th Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 955 (1992).
112
899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990), overruledby United
States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (10th Cir. 1993).
113 Jones, 899 F.2d at 1100. This remarkable holding was observed and expanded in
United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1992). Davis characterizesJones as declaring
"that bank tellers as a class were vulnerable victims under section 3Al.1 in cases involving
bank larceny." Id. at 524 n.9. The "categorization" problem reflected in Jonesand Davis is
discussed fully infr at notes 136-43 and in the accompanying text.
Jones is evoked here solely to critique the reasoning that would support defining individual bank tellers as "particularly vulnerable" to bank larceny for purposes of § 3Al.1
application. The Davis court was forced to side-step the problematic, "particularly susceptible" reasoning ofJones to arrive at its own holding that the extortion victim at issue was "no
more vulnerable to [defendant's] overtures than the garden variety extortion victim, whose
needs are vital enough to provide the necessary incentive for the would-be extortionist."
Id. at 524.
In trying to distinguish the vulnerability of one extortion victim from another, the
Davis court found that the defendant's attempts to capitalize on his victim's needs did not
reach the requisite level of depravity because "all extortion victims share a degree of inherent vulnerability, application [of the enhancement] must be reserved for situations where
the susceptibility of the victim goes beyond this general degree of susceptibility. Thus, we
must examine whether [the victim], by virtue of his circumstances, was 'particularly susceptible' to extortion, as bank tellers, by virtue of their circumstances, were to larceny." Id. at
524 n.9.
Extortion is a difficult (if not impossible) crime to enhance, inherently predicated as
it is on the vulnerability of the chosen victim. The susceptibility analysis the Eleventh Circuit is saddled with afterJones is inapplicable here: all extortion victims, by definition, are
in some manner susceptible to extortion. See United States v. Creech, 913 F.2d 780, 782
(10th Cir. 1990) (holding vulnerability of newlyweds to extortion via threats of harm to
spouse would not be "unusual" vulnerability required by guidelines). But see United States
v. Lallemand, 989 F.2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1993) (asserting that it is "feasible and proper" to
draw distinctions between classes of blackmail victims and holding that a married homosexual was particularly susceptible to, and thus a vulnerable victim of, blackmail and extortion). Contra id. at 941-42 (Ripple,J., concurring) (indicating section 3Al unsuitable and
unintended for blackmail and extortion, and calling for methodology of upward departure because applicable guideline does not adequately take into account the harm caused
by the conduct).
114 Jones, 899 F.2d at 1100.
115

Id.
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dle a great deal of money, "a teller is a very likely target of the criminal
conduct that constitutes larceny," 116 and so is "particularly susceptible
1 17
to the offense of larceny."
In United States v. Morrill1

8

the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc,

was forced to overrule its holding in Jones after a case relying on that
holding was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the position taken by the Solicitor General.' 19 In
overruling Jones, the Morrill court, writing per curiam, noted: "[a] s the
Solicitor General points out, section 3A1.1 was intended to apply only
when the special vulnerability of the victim makes the offender more
culpable than he otherwise would be in committing the particular offense."' 20 The Morrillopinion, however, goes on to hold the concept
of susceptibility distinct from that of vulnerability, suggesting that the
Eleventh Circuit views mere susceptibility as adequate to support
enhancement.
After first acknowledging that, in order to identify more culpable
offenders, section 3A1.1 application requires circumstances which differentiate a specially vulnerable victim from the typical victim of that
crime,' 2 1 the Monill Court found that "bank tellers, as a class, are not
vulnerable victims within the meaning of section 3Al.1."' 2 2 The Cir-

cuit goes on to indicate that in some cases individual tellers possessing
unique characteristics might properly be identified as vulnerable victims. That concept comports with the requirement of particular vulnerability analysis advocated in this Note. The Eleventh Circuit,
however, frames that insight in the following manner:
This is not to say that bank tellers in individual cases never may be
particularlysusceptible or otherwise vulnerable victims of a bank robbery. Enhancement is appropriate under section 3A1.1 when a particular teller-victim possesses unique characteristics which make him

116 Id. This reasoning evokes the apocryphal story of the answer given by notorious
bank robber Willie Sutton in response to the question: Why do you rob banks? "Because
that's where the money is," Sutton replied. The same insight was offered in THOMAS W.
HUTCHINSON &c DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTiCE (1989).
117 Jones, 899 F.2d at 1100. This holding seems to have motivated the November 1,

1992 amendment to section 3A1.1's Application Note 1, which inserted the sentence:
"[s]
imilarly, for example, a bank teller is not an unusually vulnerable victim solely by virtue
of the teller's position in a bank." This amendment 'clarifie [d] the circumstances in which
the vulnerable victim adjustment is intended to be applied." U.S.S.G., App. C, amend. 454.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
118 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993).
119 United States v. Morrill, 963 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded, 113 S.
Ct. 955 (1992).
120
Morrill 984 F.2d at 1137 (citations ommitted).
Id. at 1137-38.
121
122
Id. at 1138.
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or her more vulnerable or susceptible to robbery than ordinary bank
12 3
robbery victims.

To the extent that the above emphasized language indicates the Eleventh Circuit's view that mere susceptibility, without a further finding
of vulnerability, can support vulnerable victim enhancement, Morrills

overruling ofJones' specific holding perpetuates the erroneous rationale in Jones,and can only lead to further section 3A.1 misapplication.

In Jones, the Eleventh Circuit confused the concept of susceptibility with that of vulnerability. 12 4 Its analysis identified the threshold
susceptibility present in all victims of criminal conduct, namely, the
susceptibility which makes a victim a "likely target."125 The Moree
court calls this susceptibility the "vulnerability [that] made the at-

tempted crime possible."'1 26 Having identified this threshhold susceptibility, the Jones court improperly used it as the basis for the
application of section 3A1.1. In Morrill, the Eleventh Circuit perpetu-

ates this misconception by indicating that it still views findings of sus127
ceptibility as sufficient to support vulnerable victim enhancement.
Section 3A1.1, however, intends to identify particular vulnerability
within the larger class of those merely susceptible to certain criminal
conduct. 128 The "otherwise particularly susceptible" language of the
statute can only be read as expanding the enumerated categories of
vulnerability ("due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible")1 29 which can permissibly

support an ultimate finding of unusual vulnerability ("that a victim of
the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental

condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible").130
Any bald finding of "particular susceptibility"-through the
enumeration of factors that might make the victim a likely target of

the criminal conduct, but without a further, supported conclusion
that the susceptibility is emblematic of the unusual vulnerability that
123
124

Id. (emphasis added).
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.

125 See United States v. Creech, 913 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1990). The Creech court asserted that "[i]t is logical to assume the intended victim of any premeditated offense will be
selected because something in his or her persona or circumstanceswill make successful the
intended criminal act. We must therefore assume the Commission adopted § 3A1.1 to
enhance a defendant's punishment for an act of depravity." Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
126 Moree, 897 F.2d at 1335. See supra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
128 See U.S.S.G. § 3Al.1, comment., (n.1) ("This adjustment applies to offenses where
an unusually vulnerable victim is made a target of criminal activity by the defendant.").
129 U.S.S.G. 3Al.1. See United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503, 1506 (2nd Cir.
1992) ("Although listing such factors as examples tending to show vulnerability, the section nonetheless specifically provides for enhancement in cases where 'a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct,' without limitation as to the reasons
for such vulnerability") (second emphasis added).
130 U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1.
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section 3A1.1 seeks to identif---cannot support enhancement application. To allow mere susceptibility to support enhancement invites
identification of nearly all victims of criminal conduct as particularly
vulnerable.' 3 ' For example, in Jones, by focusing on the victim's susceptibility when applying enhancement, the court ignored the en32
hancements' putative function as a "moral depravity" provision.'
Furthermore, from the standpoint of uniformity in federal sentencing,' 3 3 allowing the enhancement to sweep so broadly invites selective
and unprincipled misidentification of defendants whose choice of victims requires enhancement at sentencing. The Moree court, and those
courts that adhere to Moree's requirement of particular vulnerability,' 3 4 have recognized this and applied section 3A1.1 in a correct and
consistent manner. Section 3A1.1 applications that are supported by
131
See SINGER, supra note 4, at 86-88. Cf United States v. Wilson, 913 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.
1990). In Wilson, the court observed:
The vulnerability that triggers § 3A1.1 must be an "unusual" vulnerability
which is present in only some victims of the type of crime....
Moreover, if we were to adopt the government's position, virtually every
defendant convicted of a crime involving fraudulent solicitation would be subject to an upward adjustment under § 3A1. 1. Those who engage in this criminal
activity usually target their solicitations at those they think most likely to respond to
the requests for money. We do not think, however, that the Sentencing
Commission intended on that account to impose an upward adjustment on
virtually all defendants convicted of fraudulent solicitation.
Id. at 138 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
132 United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097 (1lth Cir. 1990). See also supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
133 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
134 See, e.g., United States v. Pearce, 967 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that an
elderly, small and frail rape victim's unusual characteristics of having undergone a double
mastectomy and being in an obviously weakened condition supported a finding of "unusual vulnerability," allowing a section 3Al.1 adjustment); United States v. Newman, 965
F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the whole idea of fraud was to prey on the vulnerable, normally precluding section 3A1.1 enhancement, but holding that victims of prior
sexual abuse were particularly susceptible to future sexual abuse, a rationale which supported application of section 3A1.1 adjustment); United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94 (1st
Cir. 1991) (holding that, although victims were unemployed mothers of small children, the
youngest of whom was only 18, such victims were not specially or unusually vulnerable to
Mann Act violations); United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the victim of a defendant who relied on relative size difference, and who tested for
particular vulnerability prior to engaging in criminal conduct, was "an unusually vulnerable
victim because of his age and particularsusceptibility in the circumstances of this case") (emphasis added); United States v. Creech, 913 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that
the vulnerability of newlyweds to extortion via threats of harm to spouse would not be
'unusual" vulnerability under the guidelines); United States v. Wilson, 913 F.2d 136, 138
(4th Cir. 1990) (holding residents of town struck by tornado did not qualify as having that
"unusual vulnerability present in only some victims of that type of crime," when fraudulently solicited for hurricane relief aid); United States v. Paige, 923 F.2d 112 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that young caucasian store clerks who were targeted by defendant as inexperienced and naive were not unusual in their vulnerability so as to support the application of section 3AI.1).

19931

NOTE-FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELNES

inappropriate findings of susceptibility, and which fail to complete the
analysis by identifying the victim's particular vulnerability,1 35 do not.
A corollary problem arises when a court identifies a factor that
seems to indicate generic susceptibility, and relies on that factor alone
to support vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement. The underlying guideline value of honesty in sentencing l3 6 requires identification
of the factors affecting sentencing, as well as articulation of the court's
reasons for relying on those factors in determing the sentence. These
articulated findings are particularly crucial when courts are enhancing
sentences. 137 Sentencing for criminal conduct directed at victims
identified under the rubric "elderly," is particularly prone to this type
of § 3A1.1 misapplication. For example, in United States v. Smith,138
the Tenth Circuit analyzed a district court's characterization of an
auto theft victim as vulnerable based on a finding that she was "elderly." The circuit court noted:
There was no finding of unusual vulnerability in this case. In
sentencing [the defendant], the court simply remarked that the automobile theft "involved a vulnerable victim, that being an elderly
woman." The record is otherwise silent as to the age and physical
condition of the victim. As revealed by her testimony at trial, the
victim's mental condition appears normal.139
135

See, e.g., United States v. Fine, 974 F.2d 1344 (9th

Cir.

1992) (opinion available in

Westlaw) (holding fraud victim's friendliness, opennesss and loneliness made him particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct, thus supporting section 3Al.1 enhancement).
The "otherwise particularly susceptible" language of § 3A1.1 is fertile ground for questionable findings of victim vulnerability. See also United States v. Chick, 955 F.2d 45 (6th Cir.
1992) (opinion available in Westlaw) (holding that an ex-wife was particularly susceptible
to defendant's campaign of harrassment, and so was considered a vulnerable victim because defendant "knew where her pressure points were and which buttons to press and so
took advantage"). In United States v. Bachynsky, 949 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1991), while careful not to rely on it, the court notes in dicta that it saw no reason why either a large
insurance company or the United States Department of Defense could not be deemed
vulnerable victims of medical claims fraud because they were confronted with innumerable
fraudulent claims that on the surface appeared to justify payments, and because the sheer
number of claims passing through their claims offices could allow many false claims to slip
through the cracks. The court stated that these factors showed a "particular susceptibility
to this kind of fraud." Id. at 735-36 n.10. In contrast, the court in United States v. Newman, 965 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1992), discussed the seeming contradiction of applying
§ 3Al.1 to fraud victims-fraud by definition playing on a victim's vulnerability "in the
sense of being far below average in their ability to protect themselves .... " The court also
noted that "not all [victims] are [below average in this regard]. Some [victims] are large
corporations, or the United States .... " Id. at 211. In this properly decided case, large
corporations and the United States are clearly not vulnerable, and in fact, although capable of being defrauded, possess an inherent lack of vulnerability that serves as a benchmark
in identifying victims particularlyvulnerable to fraud.
136 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
137
See supra notes 17-18, 64-66 and accompanying text.
138

930 F.2d 1450 (10th Cir. 1991).

139

Id. at 1455.
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Holding that such a finding was insufficient to warrant enhancement
as a matter of law, the court stated:
Without more, it appears the district court equated "elderly" status
with per se vulnerability. .

.

.The label elderly, like the label

"young," is too vague standing alone, to provide the basis for a finding of unusual victim vulnerability. The use of 3A1.1 ... requires
140
analysis of the victim's personal or individual vulnerability.

Smith's holding that conclusory characterizations like "elderly"
and "young" are too vague to support vulnerable victim enhancement
is correct. Allowing generic susceptibility to support section 3Al.1 application risks generalized sentence enhancement, which would un14 1
dermine its function as an identifier of acts of particular depravity,
and would detach sentence enhancement from the distinction between victims which it seeks to identify. Certainly some elderly victims
are less vulnerable to certain criminal conduct than some younger victims who could be identified as particularly vulnerable through judicial analysis.
Requiring sentencing courts to articulate individual analysis of
victim's and their vulnerability, beyond mere identification of characteristics indicating possible susceptibility, will increase the likelihood
of properly identifying those defendants whose sentences section
3Al.1 seeks to enhance. Moreover, such articulated analysis ensures
honesty and candor in sentencing. The better reasoned, more candidly supported cases involving section 3A1.1 application based on
42
factual findings of this nature, call for and articulate such analysis;'
1 43
the less well-reasoned and supported cases do not.
140 Id. But see United States v. Brown, 989 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1993) (opinion available
in Westlaw) (allowing vulnerability enhancement based only on victim's status as elderly,
without express finding of vulnerability, where defendant stipulated he knew or should
have known that the victim was unusually vulnerable).
141 Smith, 930 F.2d at 1444-45.
142 See, e.g., United States v. Segien, 986 F.2d 439, 441 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (reversing application of section 3A1.1 and noting that in sentencing a bank robber the trial court "should
make a fact-specific determimination of what factors, if any, distinguish the teller-victim
from ordinary bank tellers ...."); United States v. Sutherland, 955 F.2d 25, 27 (7th Cir.
1992) (reversing application of section 3A1.1 based on victims' age and status as war veterans when "court did not hear any evidence ...regarding... victims... [or] evidence that
...victims were vulnerable because of age, mental incompetence, physical infirmity or any
other characteristic") (emphasis added); United States v. Lee, 973 F.2d 832 (10th Cir.
1992) (holding victim's membership in "class" of elderly, without more, insufficient to support enhancement under section 3A1.1).
143 See United States v. Caterino, 957 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
district court finding of vulnerability based on elderly status without more was "not dearly
erroneous" under "due deference" standard of review); United States v. Nishinka, 930 F.2d
30 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that an "elderly" fraud victim was vulnerable, without more,
because of her age and financial status); United States v. Rodger, 983 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.
1993) (opinion available in Westlaw) (affording "due deference" to district court determination that 82 year old woman was vulnerable victim to fraud). Cf. United States v.Rocha,
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B. Targeted Because Vulnerable v. Targeted and Vulnerable
Another variation between the circuits in their application of section 3Al.1 concerns the proper role of a defendant's motives. A
schism has developed between the circuit court's regarding the role
that victim vulnerability must play in motivating criminal conduct and
victim selection in order to trigger section 3Al.1. Some circuits have
imposed a requirement that the particular vulnerability, once identified, must have played a role in the defendant's decision to target the
victim. Other circuits have held that once the victim's vulnerability to
the criminal conduct has been established, the sentencing court
should apply the enhancement, irrespective of whether the vulnerability motivated the defendant to target the particular victim.
Three reasons support the conclusion that "vulnerability motivation" is not required by section 3Al.1. First, the requirement cannot
be found in section 3Al.l's plain language. Second, a vulnerability
motivation requirement renders the enhancement's "should have
known" language internally inapplicable. Third, those circuits which
require vulnerability motivation limit application of the enhancement
to a smaller class of defendants, severely undermining the guidelines'
goals of proportionality in sentencing and uniformity among those
sentenced.
The roots of the vulnerability motivation requirement may be
found in the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Cree.144 In
Cree, the court reversed the district court's application of the enhancement to a defendant sentenced for striking and killing a pedestrian
with his car. 145 Rejecting the prosecution's argument that the defendant intended to kill his victim, the jury found the defendant guilty of
involuntary manslaughter, acquitting him of second degree murder.' 4 6 The sentencing court applied section 3A1.1 after finding that
the victim was drunk, holding that this alcohol-related vulnerability
47
triggered the enhancement.
On appeal, the defendant conceded both that he knew his victim
had been drinking and that such activity could render his victim more
vulnerable. 148 He argued, however, that his acquittal of second degree murder implied the jury's conclusion that he "had not 'chosen'
anyone" as the victim of his criminal conduct. 149 The Eighth Circuit
916 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming application of enhancement based on the youth of
kidnap victim because his age made him more vulnerable to believing defendant's story
that Colombians would capture and kill him if he tried to escape).
144
915 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1990).
145
Id. at 354.
146
Id. at 353.
147

Id. at 354.

148

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

149
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agreed, reversing the section 3A1.1 enhancement of the defendant's
sentence.
If this had been the extent of the Cree holding, reversal of the
application would have comported with the guideline. Had the Cree
court limited the basis of its reversal to a holding that the verdict manifested a finding of fact by the jury that the defendant had not
targeted his victim (i.e., that the victim was struck inadvertently, as
opposed to targeted by a defendant who intended to harm his victim,
but did not intend to cause death), 150 then the court could properly
have found that the facts of the case placed this defendant outside of
the application note language, which states that the "adjustment applies to offenses where an unusually vulnerable victim is made a target
of the criminal activity."' 5 1 But the Cree court held that to trigger application of section 3A1.1, the victim must have been "selected because
of an unusual vulnerability." 15 2 The court wrote:
Moreover, even assuming, as the district judge believed, that
Cree intended to hit [his victim,] there is no evidence that Cree
chose to do so because of [the victim's] alcohol-related vulnerability.... [t] here is no evidence that this "vulnerability" played a role in
Gree's decision-making: [the victim] was a victim who simply "hap153
pened" to be intoxicated.
The Cree court quotes dicta from United States v. Creech,154 and
cites United States v. Boult,155 United States v. Moree,156 and United States
v. Salyer' 57 in support of its proposition that the application of section
3A1.1 requires that the sentencing court find both particular vulnerability and vulnerability-motivation. None of these cases, however, inquire whether a defendant's choice of victim was motivated by the
150
See United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The Cree court's
interpretation of the guideline conflates the mens rearequired to convict the defendant of
the crime and the culpability required to trigger the application of § 3Al.l.").
151 U.S.S.G. § 3Al.1, comment.(n.1).
152
Cree, 915 F.2d at 354.
153 Id. at 355 (citing Application Note 1, Guideline § 3A1.1). The Cree court cites to
Application Note 1, as amended on November 1, 1989, which contains the language "offenses where an unusually vulnerable victim is made a target of criminal activity by the
defendant." An earlier version of the guidelines, amended to "clarify the guideline and
commentary," deleted the language "any offense where the victim's vulnerability played
any part in the defendant's decision to commit the offense." See supra note 54 for a history
of § 3A1.1 amendments.
154 "[U] nless the criminal act is directed against the young, the aged, the handicapped,
or unless the victim is chosen because of some unusual personal vulnerability, § 3A1.1
cannot be employed." Cree, 915 F.2d at 354 (citing United States v. Creech, 913 F.2d 780
(10th Cir. 1990)).
155 905 F.2d 1137, 1139 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying
text.
156
897 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying
text.
157 893 F.2d 113, 116-17 (6th Cir. 1989). See infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
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requisite vulnerability. Nor do they reverse an application of section
3Al.1 upon finding that a defendant's targeting of a victim was not
motivated by vulnerability. Finally, none support Cree's proposition
that enhancement is justified only when the defendant was vulnerability-motivated in targeting his or her victim for criminal conduct. 158
The plain language of section 3A1.1 and its accompanying commentary 5 9 merely require that defendants make an unusually vulnerable victim the target of their criminal conduct. The vulnerability of
the victim need not have motivated either the defendant's criminal
conduct or victim selection. Certainly those defendants who perceive
a victim's particular vulnerability and are inspired by that perception
to direct their criminal conduct towards that victim reside at the paradigm center of the class that the enhancement seeks to identify. However, those defendants who simply direct their criminal conduct at
158 All of these cases turn on the inquiry into "particular vulnerability" that is described
in supra notes 100-43 and accompanying text.
Creechreverses application of § 3A1.1 because it finds that the victim's vulnerability was
not "unusual." Creech, 913 F.2d at 782. Boult finds the victim "unusually vulnerable," and
affirms the enhancement. Bou/t; 905 F.2d at 1139. Moree reverses § 3A1.1 enhancement
because the victim's vulnerability was not "unusual." Moree, 897 F.2d at 1335. Salyer finds
that a defendant "knowingly [took] advantage of a particular susceptibility of the intended
victim" Salyer, 893 F.2d at 116.
Creechis the Rosetta Stone that must be deciphered in order to pinpoint the genesis of
this improper application requirement. The Creech dicta relied on by the Cree court, see
supra note 152, is preceded by the collegial language: "We agree with the Fifth Circuit."
Creech, 913 F.2d at 782. Apparently the Cree court was referring to the Moree language
quoted earlier in Creech. "[tlhe vulnerability that triggers § 3A1.1 must be an 'unusual'
vulnerability which is present in only some victims of that type of crime. Otherwise, the
defendant's choice of a likely victim does not show the extra measure of criminal depravity
which § 3A1.1 intends to more severely punish." Creech, 913 F.2d at 782 (quotingMoree 897
F.2d at 1335).
Careful reading of this Moree language will not yield a requirement that vulnerability
motivate the criminal conduct. It merely supports the proposition maintained throughout
this Note-that to properly apply the enhancement a defendant must only have chosen an
unusually vulnerable victim that he knew, or should have known, was particularly vulnerable, as the target of his criminal conduct.
159 The example contained in § 3A1.1, Commentary Note One, which states that the
enhancement "would not apply in a case where the defendant sold fraudulent securities by
mail to the general public and one of the victims happened to be senile," U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1,
comment.(n.1), also seems prone to being misinterpreted a requirement that the victim's
vulnerability have motivated the defendant's selection of the victim or the criminal conduct. See also supra note 54.
Close reading reveals that this language bears only on the distinction between targeting the general public, (and thus inadvertently snaring the vulnerable), and targeting a
specific class of vulnerable victims for fraudulent conduct. The Application Note imposes
no overall requirement that only criminal conduct motivated by victim vulnerability can
trigger the enhancement. It requires nothing more than that which this Note identifies: a
defendant need only target a particularly vulnerable victim. See United States v. Caterino,
957 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1991) (reading the commentary's mail fraud example as excluding
defendants who do not know and could not have known that they are dealing with a vulnerable individual, rendering it consistent with the guideline's "should have known"
language.).
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those they know, or should have known, are particularly vulnerable
also fall within § 3A1.1's ambit.
Further militating for application of section 3A1.1 to defendants
who were not motivated by their victim's vulnerability is the enhancement's language requiring application to not only persons who knew,
but those who "should have known that a victim of the offense was
unusually vulnerable.' 60 This clause clearly envisions enhancement
application to defendants who were not aware of victim vulnerability, 161 but should have been under the circumstances. A court cannot
consistently enhance a sentence by using its power to impute knowledge of vulnerability to a defendant while simultaneously requiring
162
that the victim's vulnerability have motivated the criminal conduct.
An enhancement which allows a sentencing court to charge a defendant with knowledge that he did not have cannot further require that
the knowledge that the defendant did not possess must have motivated
either his criminal conduct or his victim selection.
The Ninth Circuit has repudiated the requirement of vulnerability motivation and properly applied the enhancement to all defendants who target a particularly vulnerable victim. In United States v.
Boise,' 63 a defendant convicted of second-degree murder for the beating death of his six-week-old son appealed section 3A1.1 enhancement of his sentence. Echoing Cree,'6 the court wrote, "[defendant]
argues that the Commentary to the vulnerable victim guideline requires a defendant to select a victim intentionally because of his vulnerability. We disagree."' 65 Citing the guideline and commentary
language, the Boise Court held that the "[defendant's] son was a vulnerable victim for purposes of adjusting the base offense level because
a six-week old infant is 'unusually vulnerable due to age,' not because
66
[defendant] selected him because of his vulnerability.'
160

U.S.S.G. § 3Al.1.

161

See United States v. Luscier, 983 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming application of

section 3Al.1 to a defendant who argued that he was too intoxicated to realize victim was
vulnerable, and holding that the defendant was responsible for his level of intoxication
and should have known victim was vulnerable); Caterino,957 F.2d at 684 ("district judge's
finding that Appellants knew or should have known of their victims' vulnerability is entitled to due deference as a factual finding"); see also Salyer, 893 F.2d at 115 ("defendant
knew or should have known that the [victims] were unusually vulnerable to the threat of
cross burning because they are black").
See Caterino, 957 F.2d at 683 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 129 (1993)
162
("Where possible, we construe the text of a Guidelines section and its associated commentary to be consistent with one another.").
163
916 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 2057 (1991).
915 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1990). Indeed, the language and structure of the holding
164
directly track that of Cree.
Boise, 916 F.2d at 506.
165
166
Id. (citations omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit properly concluded that a defendant's knowledge (real or imputed) of vulnerability, coupled with criminal
conduct directed at a vulnerable victim, is enough to support enhancement application. Sentencing courts need not conduct elaborate and very likely impossible 167 inquiries into whether the identified
vulnerability caused the criminal conduct. Nor must they allow defendants who clearly targeted particularly vulnerable victims to escape
the extra punishment that the guidelines mandate for such criminal
conduct.
The Ninth Circuit's reading of the enhancement is consonant
with its plain language and renders the guideline internally consistent. The cases that follow the Ninth Circuit's approach are the better
reasoned cases. 168 Those courts which require vulnerability motivated
victim selection' 6 9 have judicially imposed a requirement not con167
Under the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, see U.S. Const.
amend. V, inquiry into the internal motivation of a defendant would seem to be virtually
impossible absent a defendant's own testimony as to what truly led to his criminal conduct
and selection of a particular victim.
168
See United States v. Caterino, 957 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting appellant's
argument that enhancement requires defendants to single out vulnerable victims for
harm). See alsoUnited States v. Sutherland, 955 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting application of § 3AL.1 where there was no evidence that either defendants targeted elderly to
exploit age or that targets were particularly vulnerable to fraud); United States v. Green,
988 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1993) (opinion available in Westlaw) (section 3Al.1 applied to defendant sentenced for homicide of five-month-old daughter); United States v. Flores, 946
F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991, as amended 1992) (opinion available in Westlaw) ("[a]pplication
of enhancement is mandatory once the district court finds facts sufficient to establish a
vulnerable victim .... [and] [b]ecause Flores knew his daughter was three weeks old at the
time of the assault, this enhancement was available."). Cf. United States v. White, 974 F.2d
1135 (9th Cir. 1992). White affirms application of the enhancement to an appellant convicted of involuntary manslaughter of his two-year-old stepdaughter. It rejects the Cree
court's reasoning as to the application of the enhancement to non-intent crimes, writing
that even if Boise did not foreclose application of Cree, "we would reject Cree's reasoning."
Id. at 1140. According to the court, "[m]erely because the crime itself was not intentional
does not mean the defendant did not 'kn[o]w or should have known that [the] victim of the
offense was unusually vulnerable due to age .... '"under section 3Al.1. The court, however, first indicates that application of Creeis foreclosed in the Ninth Circuit by Bois4 which
it characterizes as announcing the "rule" that "crimes against children trigger § 3A1.1 regardless of whether the defendant intentionally selects them due to their vulnerabilities."
Id. This mischaracterizes Boise's clear holding that the application of § 3AL.1 in the Ninth
Circuit does not require vulnerability motivated targeting of victims.
169
See United States v. Callaway, 943 F.2d 29, 31 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting application
of enhancement because, "[a]lthough record shows that [victim]... was both young and
handicapped, the record does not support a finding that Callaway chose [victim] as a 'target' for the crime because of her youth and physical handicaps."); United States v. Long,
935 F.2d 1207, 1210 (l1th Cir. 1991) ("adjustment... focuses chiefly on the conduct of
the defendant ... where the defendantselects the victim due to the victim's perceived susceptibility to the offense."); United States v. White, 903 F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming application of enhancement but responding to defendant's argument that
"victim's vulnerability had nothing to do with [defendant's] decision to kidnap" by holding
that it was "not only reasonable but logical to believe that White decided upon the gasoline
station attendant as a kidnap hostage after having observed his advanced age and respira-
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tained within the guideline. In doing so, they undermine the guideline's twin goals of proportionality and uniformity in sentencing. 170
C.

The Per Se Vulnerable Victim Problem

The final problematic application of section 3A1.1 addressed by
this Note is the tendency of certain courts to engage in the judicial
shorthand of identifying categories of persevictims particularly vulnerable to particular criminal conduct. 17 1 These courts mandate application of the enhancement for victims that they have found are
vulnerable as a "matter of law." However, generic inquiry into both
sides of the analysis (victim and conduct) cannot substitute for the
particularized inquiry into victim, conduct and context which consistent application of the enhancement requires.
This concept of per se, "matter of law" vulnerability is explicitly
addressed by both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits in the context of
the following compelling question: Are black Americans vulnerable
victims to cross-burnings committed in furtherance of criminal activity?172 The Sixth Circuit has held that black Americans are unusually

vulnerable to the threat of cross-burnings. The Eleventh Circuit, on
the other hand, has held that section 3A1.1 is not applicable as a mattory problems that rendered him unable to resist and flee from his attack."); United States
v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450, 1455 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 225 (1991) (reversing
§ 3A1.1 application on other grounds, but noting that "the record is also silent as to [defendant's] motivation in selecting this particular victim").
170 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
171 Categorization by generic factors which might lead to a finding of particular vulnerability, as discussed in supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. Per se categorization
may arguably be an improvement over the generic factoring discussed previously, since it
generally makes reference to both particular vulnerability and a class of criminal conduct
when triggering § 3A1.1. As this Note demonstrates, however, it still cuts impermissibly
short the particularized inquiry into the victim, the conduct and the circumstances that is
required by the enhancement.
172 A prosecution for cross-burning was barred by the First Amendment in R.A.V., Petitioner v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992). However, as Justice Scalia
noted in St. Pau4 "[wihere the Government does not target conduct on the basis of its
expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a
discriminatory idea or philosophy." Id. at 2546-47.
Cross-burning targeted not for its expressive content, but as an activity committed in
furtherance of criminal conduct frequently arises in the context of prosecutions for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), 42 U.S.C § 3631(b) (1)
(interference with housing rights by means of force or threat of force resulting in bodily
injury), and 18 U.S.C. 844(h) (1) (use of explosive in the commission of a felony). Numerous courts have held that race is not a factor incorporated into the base offense guidelines
applicable to the above statutes. See United States v. Salyer, 893 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Long, 935 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d
1370 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 353 (1991); Munger v. U.S., 827 F. Supp. 100
(N.D.N.Y. 1992).
It bears mention here that guideline sentences are computed on the basis of all relevant conduct, not merely charged criminal conduct.
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ter of law merely because a cross-burning victim is black. Both holdings result from similar crimes, circumstances and inquiries.
In United States v. Salyer,173 after a particularly searching analysis,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed application of the enhancement, holding
that "the defendant knew or should have known that the [victims]
were unusually vulnerable to the threat of cross-burning because they
74
are black."
In Salyer, the defendant had burned a cross in the front yard of an
elderly black couple's residence. The defendant pleaded guilty to one
count (conspiracy to violate rights of a citizen) 175 of a three count
indictment"7 6 At sentencing, the district court applied the two-level
vulnerable victim enhancement. The defendant appealed the sentence enhancement, arguing that, while blacks might be statistically
more likely than whites to be the victims of cross-burning, they were
no more susceptible to intimidation by cross-burning than whites or
17 7
other minorities.
Affirming the application, the Sixth Circuit wrote that "a black
American would be particularly susceptible to the threat of cross-burning because of the historical connotations of violence associated with
the act.' 7 8 Quoting from the district court opinion, the court asserts:
[A] black person is more likely than other minorities to be the victim
of a cross burning because the act has a special capacity to evoke
terror among black Americans....
'There is a history of violence and intimidation which is directed
against blacks and which is symbolized by a burning cross. That's
exactly the symbol that these defendants chose to invoke and they
chose to do so because that is precisely the way in which the family was most vulnerable to the threat of intimidation.'...
We find that the district court's determination that cross burning is
a particularly invidious act when directed against a black American,
making him particularly susceptible to the commission of the of79
fense, is not clearly erroneous.'
Up until this point, the reasoning of the Salyercourt articulated above
is sound. In its own words, the circuit has identified a "particular susceptibility" among black Americans, making them "more likely than
other[s]" to be targeted for this criminal conduct. 8 0 However, the
173
174

893 F.2d 113 (6th

175

18 U.S.C. § 241.

Id. at 115.

Cir. 1989).

The indictment included counts for interference of housing rights by threat or
intimidation, (42 U.S.C. § 3631(a)) and use of explosive in commission of a felony (18
176

U.S.C. § 844(h) (1)).
177

Salyer, 893 F.2d at 116.

178

Id.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 116.

179
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court exceeded that which its reasoning established when it announced that black people victimized by cross-burning are per se vulnerable victims. 181
Although cross-burning directed against black Americans is particularly invidious, the Salyer court errs in adopting the logic that this
invidiousness somehow makes its targets particularly vulnerable to the
act. Cross-burning directed at depriving individuals of their constitutional rights is heinous. However, social abhorrence of such conduct
should be reflected in the underlying offense guideline and accompanying mandated sentence. The vulnerable victim enhancement
should not be used to increase the sentence for those acts that an
individual court considers particularly maleficent. To do so eviscerates the enhancement's unique role, rendering it a vehicle for individual judicial expressions of detestation for particular criminal conduct.
The susceptibility that the court identifies, while inextricably related to the vulnerability to cross-burning shared by many black Americans, should not alone trigger section 3A1.1 enhancement at
sentencing. The enhancement requires identification of the particular victim's vulnerability in the context of both the specific criminal
conduct and the circumstances under which the criminal conduct occurred. The specific analysis which the Salyer court sought to apply to
black Americans generally must be applied to each particular victim,
case-by-case. Surely there are many black Americans who are not vulnerable to the threat implicit in cross-burning: for example black
Americans capable of responding forcefully and effectively to such
conduct. Certainly one can envision circumstances where criminal
cross-burning would be unable to produce the desired fear and insecurity in its targeted victims. For example, given the cowardly nature
of such dead-of-night, hit-and-run conduct, one can imagine a crossburner caught in the act who is far more vulnerable to the anger of his
intended victims, than the intended victims were to his criminal
conduct.
Put simply, the Salyer court actually identifies a per se susceptibility
to this conduct shared by black Americans. This susceptibility will almost always lend support to the invocation of the "should have
known" aspect of the enhancement. Furthermore, this susceptibility
will serve to support the identification of race as one factor which will
bear upon a finding of vulnerability when a particular black American
is victimized in this manner. It will not support per se application of
enhancement of sentencing. Proper section 3A1.1 application requires a final, particularized inquiry into the victim, the conduct and
181 Tellingly, the court writes that "cross-burning is a particularly invidious act when
directed against a black American, making him particularly susceptibleto the commission of
the offense .... " Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
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the context. Only a particularized, rather than a per se inquiry, will
82
yield appropriate, properly supported sentence enhancement.
The Eleventh Circuit has gone further to resolve the question addressed by the Salyer court. In United States v. Long, 8s the Eleventh
Circuit wrote:
We consider first the government's invitation to adopt a presumption that, as a matter of law, the vulnerable victim adjustment
should be applied whenever the victim of a cross-burning is a black
American. For the reasons outlined below, we think such a presumption misapprehends the purpose behind
section 3A1.1 and its
84
proper application on a case-by-case basis.'
The court in Long eschewed the shorthand of per se vulnerability, and
went on to articulate § 3Al.l's requisite particularized inquiry into
vulnerability.
The Long defendants, like Salyes, pleaded guilty to one count
(conspiracy to violate rights of a citizen)' 8 5 of a three count indictment. 8 6 The defendants had burnt a cross on the lawn of a black
family who had recently moved into a rural, all-white area. 8 7 The district court rejected the government's motion for application of section 3A1.1 to the defendants sentences and the government
appealed.188
The Eleventh Circuit wholly rejected the government's invitation
to adopt a circuit-wide presumption of vulnerability as to black Americans targeted for cross-burning. Although the court blundered into
the question of whether to require vulnerability as the motivator of
victim targeting, 8 9 the court correctly wrote that "[s]weeping presumptions are not favored by section 3A1.1. Instead, the inquiry conducted by a sentencing judge to determine the applicability of section
182
Ironically, after improperly finding per se vulnerability in this context, the exceedingly comprehensive Salyer opinion goes on to make such an inquiry, citing the isolation of
the victims due to their rural residence, and finding through particularized inquiry that
the individual victims had knowledge of the symbolism of cross-burning. Salyer, 893 F.2d at
114 ("they had no doubt as to what the cross represented"). The circumstances surrounding the criminal conduct rendered these victims particularly vulnerable. In the context of
Salyer, the court did not need to rely on per se vulnerability to trigger the enhancement.
The court properly affirmed the enhancement based on an appropriate, particularized
inquiry.
183 935 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1991).
184 Long, 935 F.2d at 1210.
185 18 U.S.C. § 241.
186 The indictment also included counts for interference of housing rights by threat or
intimidation, (42 U.S.C. § 3631 (a)) and use of fire in commission of a felony (18 U.S.C.
§ 844(h) (1)).
187 Long, 935 F.2d at 1209.

188

Id. at 1212.

189 A "presumption of vulnerability for the black victims of cross-burning inadequately
considers the defendant's motive in selecting the victims." Long, 935 F.2d at 1210; see generally supranotes 144-70 and accompanying text.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[-Vol. 79:143

3A1.1 is a mixed question of law and fact, and highly case-specific as a
result." 190
The court, after declining to allow enhancement based solely on
the victim's testimony, 19 1 went on to perform and articulate the appropriate case-specific particularized analysis. First, the court explicitly authorized the use of race as a vulnerability factor, acknowledging
that it was relevant to the vulnerability inquiry. 92 The court then
identified the following factors which indicated particularized vulnerability in the instant case: the race of the victims, the rural isolated
character of their residence, the racial isolation of the victims as the
only blacks in an all-white community, and the time of night the defendants chose to act. The court held that "these factors, considered
in their totality, are sufficient to justify application of section 3A1.1 to
...

[the] defendants." 193 Declining to express an opinion as to which

factor's absence would have precluded section 3Al.1 enhancement,
the court wrote that "such a determination is better left to case-by-case
19 4
analysis."'
In Long, the Eleventh Circuit correctly perceived that section
3A1.1 "does not favor sweeping presumptions." Enhancement of
sentences based on judicial generalizations, even generalizations carefully considering both the victim and the criminal conduct, neglects
the necessary inquiry into the particular circumstances of the conduct
being sentenced. Without such inquiry, the enhancement's role in
identifying the particularly depraved among those who engage in substantially similar criminal conduct is circumvented. Such circumvention undermines the guideline's goal of proportionality in sentencing.
While such presumptions may offer the illusion of furthering the
overall congressional goal of uniformity in sentencing, Congress never
intended to purchase uniformity at the price of sacrificing particularized inquiry into criminal conduct. "As Congress has noted 'a determination under section 3A1.1 of the sentencing guidelines depends
heavily on the unique factual pattern of the case, that determination
cannot be considered simply a legal question.' -195 Those courts that
eschew presumption for particularized inquiry' 96 correctly apply the
Long, 935 F.2d at 1210.
191 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
192 Long, 935 F.2d at 1212. Cf. United States v. McAninch, 994 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, - S. Ct. -, 1993 WL 303752 (acknowledging race as a section 3Al.1
190

factor and noting that race is an improper departure ground, but allowing upward departure based on a defendant's racist motivation).
193 Long, 935 F.2d at 1212.
194

Id.

195 Id. at 1210-11 (quoting 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 151 Cong.Rec. 11,257 (1988)).
196 See, e.g., United States v. Gamer, 985 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1993) (opinion available in
Westlaw) (noting that some courts hold that "race alone may not serve as the only basis for
a [3A1.1] enhancement" and affirming enhancement of defendant sentenced for commu-
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guidelines at sentencing; those courts that replace such inquiry with
generalizations and presumptions as to victim vulnerability 97 do not.
CONCLUSION

This Note has acquainted the reader with the goals of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in general, and the particular role that the
§ 3A1.1 vulnerable victim enhancement plays in effectuating those
goals. The preceding analysis has identified problem areas encountered by various courts as they have attempted to apply the enhancement in a just and consistent fashion. This Note has also identified
approaches and solutions to these problems that are consistent with
the plain language of Section 3A1.1. In turn, this language embodies
the Sentencing Commission's determination of the role best played by
victim vulnerability concerns at sentencing.
Sentencing courts should apply section 3A1.1 to the sentences of
defendants who have targeted the particularly vulnerable as victims of
their criminal conduct. By definition, only particularly vulnerable victims identify the more depraved and heinous defendants that section
3A1.1 seeks to punish. Once the court identifies this class of defendant through particularized inquiry into the victim and the context of
the defendant's criminal conduct, and then articulates reasoning to
support its finding of particular vulnerability, section 3A1.1 is triggered and the defendant's sentence can and must be properly
enhanced.
The preceding analysis further advocates a rejection of the requirement that the victim's particular vulnerability motivate the defendant to target the victim for criminal conduct. No such
nicating racial threats based on victim's race and further findings of threats to victim's son
and girl friend); United States v. Pavao, 948 F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1991) (affirming applica-

tion of § 3A1.1 to a "drug user" based on the sentencing court's opportunity to see the
victim, but explicitly noting that "we should hesitate to say that anyone involved with drugs
becomes ipso facto a 'vulnerable victim' to a crime like that of [the defendant]"); United
States v. Creech, 913 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting application of enhancement
because district court "did not focus on the victim, but rather upon a class of persons to
which the victim belonged"); United States v. Sutherland, 955 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting district court presumption of the elderly as per se vulnerable to fraud); Munger
v. U.S., 827 F. Supp. 100 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (declining to adopt per se categorization of all
black Americans as vulnerable to acts of cross-burning).
197
See United States v. Clark, 956 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1992) (opinion available in
Westlaw) (holding female juvenile detainee constitutes "vulnerable class of victim" as to
sexual assault); United States v. Dry, 962 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1992) (opinion available in
Westlaw) (establishing the rule of law that mothers of young children may be considered
vulnerable victims in kidnapping cases); United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990), overruled by United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136
(11th Cir. 1993) (holding that all bank tellers are vulnerable victims as to bank larceny);
United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 516, 524 n.9 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming reasoning that all
bank tellers are vulnerable victims as to bank larceny).
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requirement can be justified by the plain language of section 3Al.1.
Neither can such a requirement be imposed consistently with the
court's power to impute knowledge to those who should have known
their victims were particularly vulnerable. Those courts that impose
this requirement undermine the sentencing goals of proportionality
and uniformity.
Finally, this Note calls for a rejection of victim categorization and
findings of per se, as a matter of law vulnerability. Only a fully particularized inquiry into the totality of circumstances surrounding the victim, the defendant, and the context of the criminal conduct can
ensure measured, consistent and just sentencing under the federal
sentencing guidelines.
John Ganyt
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